via Ezra Klein on 3/21/11
Josh Marshall's pessimistic take on Libya is among the best I've read. But at one point in his argument, he hedges. "Maybe we do this and then that rejuvenates the opposition and Qaddafi is gone in a week. If that happens, great. Egg on my face."
I'm not so sure about that. Policy analysis is a game of probabilities that gets judged, understandably but incorrectly, on outcomes. It's possible that entering Libya is a bad idea, but for reasons outside our control, it will turn out all right. Or perhaps it's a good idea that should've worked out, but because of some bad decision making on the part of the rebels, or some unexpected tactical brilliance on Gaddafi's part, it will fall apart.
In these things, it's better to be lucky than good. But we can't elect lucky. We can only elect good. And so we have to judge process, and planning, and whether we're comfortable with the range of potential outcomes that the president has exposed us to. In this post, James Fallows does exactly that, and his judgment isn't kind. Which doesn't mean the mission will fail. This might turn out well. I pray that it does. But if it turns out well because we were lucky rather than because we were good, that's, well, not good enough.
